566 ideas
| 548 | Knowledge chosen for its own sake, rather than for results, is wisdom [Aristotle] |
| 11228 | Wisdom seeks explanations, causes, and reasons why things are as they are [Aristotle, by Politis] |
| 545 | It is not much help if a doctor knows about universals but not the immediate particular [Aristotle] |
| 549 | All philosophy begins from wonder, either at the physical world, or at ideas [Aristotle] |
| 1576 | If each of us can give some logos about parts of nature, our combined efforts can be impressive [Aristotle] |
| 609 | Philosophy is a kind of science that deals with principles [Aristotle] |
| 624 | Absolute thinking is the thinking of thinking [Aristotle] |
| 572 | Philosophy has different powers from dialectic, and a different life from sophistry [Aristotle] |
| 22171 | If only natural substances exist, science is first philosophy - but not if there is an immovable substance [Aristotle] |
| 11242 | Wisdom is knowledge of principles and causes [Aristotle] |
| 12038 | Translate as 'humans all desire by nature to understand' (not as 'to know') [Aristotle, by Annas] |
| 559 | Even people who go astray in their opinions have contributed something useful [Aristotle] |
| 9438 | Maybe analysis seeks the 'nominal essence', and metaphysics seeks the 'real essence' [Locke, by Mumford] |
| 7653 | I am just an under-labourer, clearing the ground in preparation for knowledge [Locke] |
| 12526 | Opposition to reason is mad [Locke] |
| 623 | It is readily agreed that thinking is the most godlike of things in our experience [Aristotle] |
| 1601 | The most certain basic principle is that contradictories can't be true at the same time [Aristotle] |
| 11281 | We cannot say that one thing both is and is not a man [Aristotle] |
| 11282 | Aristotle does not take the principle of non-contradiction for granted [Aristotle, by Politis] |
| 6561 | A thing cannot be both in and not-in the same thing (at a given time) [Aristotle] |
| 1602 | For Aristotle predication is regulated by Non-Contradiction, because underlying stability is essential [Roochnik on Aristotle] |
| 608 | There is no middle ground in contradiction, but there is in contrariety [Aristotle] |
| 627 | If everything is made of opposites, are the opposed things made of opposites? [Aristotle] |
| 628 | Not everything is composed of opposites; what, for example, is the opposite of matter? [Aristotle] |
| 10957 | The material element may be essential to a definition [Aristotle] |
| 10953 | The parts of a definition are isomorphic to the parts of the entity [Aristotle] |
| 10960 | If we define 'man' as 'two-footed animal', why does that make man a unity? [Aristotle] |
| 16094 | You can't define particulars, because accounts have to be generalised [Aristotle] |
| 10944 | A definition must be of something primary [Aristotle] |
| 596 | Only substance [ousias] admits of definition [Aristotle] |
| 16107 | Sometimes parts must be mentioned in definitions of essence, and sometimes not [Aristotle] |
| 12360 | Definitions need the complex features of form, and don't need to mention the category [Aristotle, by Wedin] |
| 12355 | 'Plane' is the genus of plane figures, and 'solid' of solids, with differentiae picking out types of corner [Aristotle] |
| 12352 | Whiteness can only belong to man because an individual like Callias happens to be white [Aristotle] |
| 11383 | A definition is of the universal and of the kind [Aristotle] |
| 10961 | Definition by division is into genus and differentiae [Aristotle] |
| 12356 | If the genus is just its constitutive forms (or matter), then the definition is the account of the differentiae [Aristotle] |
| 17040 | If I define you, I have to use terms which are all true of other things too [Aristotle] |
| 12353 | Species and genera are largely irrelevant in 'Metaphysics' [Aristotle, by Wedin] |
| 12081 | Aristotle's definitions are not unique, but apply to a range of individuals [Aristotle, by Witt] |
| 12538 | Genus is a partial conception of species, and species a partial idea of individuals [Locke] |
| 12080 | Essence is not all the necessary properties, since these extend beyond the definition [Aristotle, by Witt] |
| 11153 | A definition is an account of a what-it-was-to-be-that-thing [Aristotle] |
| 16797 | Maybe Locke described the real essence of a person [Locke, by Pasnau] |
| 15770 | Some things cannot be defined, and only an analogy can be given [Aristotle] |
| 574 | Not everything can be proven, because that would lead to an infinite regress [Aristotle] |
| 12573 | Ad Hominem: press a man with the consequences of his own principle [Locke] |
| 12491 | Asking whether man's will is free is liking asking if sleep is fast or virtue is square [Locke] |
| 10913 | Truth is a matter of asserting correct combinations and separations [Aristotle] |
| 10914 | Simple and essential truth seems to be given, with further truth arising in thinking [Aristotle] |
| 10916 | Truth is either intuiting a way of being, or a putting together [Aristotle] |
| 12549 | Nothing is so beautiful to the eye as truth is to the mind [Locke] |
| 12558 | Truth only belongs to mental or verbal propositions [Locke] |
| 12522 | It is propositions which are true or false, though it is sometimes said of ideas [Locke] |
| 12523 | If they refer to real substances, 'man' is a true idea and 'centaur' a false one [Locke] |
| 575 | If one error is worse than another, it must be because it is further from the truth [Aristotle] |
| 15775 | Truth-thinking does not make it so; it being so is what makes it true [Aristotle] |
| 10915 | The truth or falsity of a belief will be in terms of something that is always this way not that [Aristotle] |
| 586 | Falsity says that which is isn't, and that which isn't is; truth says that which is is, and that which isn't isn't [Aristotle] |
| 19165 | Aristotle's truth formulation concerns referring parts of sentences, not sentences as wholes [Aristotle, by Davidson] |
| 8084 | Syllogisms are verbal fencing, not discovery [Locke] |
| 12572 | Many people can reason well, yet can't make a syllogism [Locke] |
| 562 | Axioms are the underlying principles of everything, and who but the philosopher can assess their truth? [Aristotle] |
| 573 | The axioms of mathematics are part of philosophy [Aristotle] |
| 10055 | Mathematical proofs work, irrespective of whether the objects exist [Locke] |
| 22154 | For Aristotle bivalence is a feature of reality [Aristotle, by Boulter] |
| 11273 | Aporia 12: Do mathematical entities exist independently, or only in objects? [Aristotle, by Politis] |
| 11274 | Aporia 13: Are there kinds, as well as particulars and mathematical entities? [Aristotle, by Politis] |
| 11275 | Aporia 14: Are ultimate causes of things potentialities, or must they be actual? [Aristotle, by Politis] |
| 11264 | Aporia 3: Does one science investigate all being, or does each kind of being have a science? [Aristotle, by Politis] |
| 11265 | Aporia 4: Does metaphysics just investigate pure being, or also the characteristics of being? [Aristotle, by Politis] |
| 11270 | Aporia 9: Is there one principle, or one kind of principle? [Aristotle, by Politis] |
| 11258 | We must start with our puzzles, and progress by solving them, as they reveal the real difficulty [Aristotle] |
| 11271 | Aporia 10: Do perishables and imperishables have the same principle? [Aristotle, by Politis] |
| 11262 | Aporia 1: is there one science of explanation, or many? [Aristotle, by Politis] |
| 11263 | Aporia 2: Does one science investigate both ultimate and basic principles of being? [Aristotle, by Politis] |
| 11266 | Aporia 5: Do other things exist besides what is perceptible by the senses? [Aristotle, by Politis] |
| 11272 | Aporia 11: Are primary being and unity distinct, or only in the things that are? [Aristotle, by Politis] |
| 11267 | Aporia 6: Are the basic principles of a thing the kinds to which it belongs, or its components? [Aristotle, by Politis] |
| 11268 | Aporia 7: Is a thing's kind the most general one, or the most specific one? [Aristotle, by Politis] |
| 11269 | Aporia 8: Are there general kinds, or merely particulars? [Aristotle, by Politis] |
| 11276 | Aporia 15: Are the causes of things universals or particulars? [Aristotle, by Politis] |
| 560 | Mathematical precision is only possible in immaterial things [Aristotle] |
| 9076 | Mathematics studies the domain of perceptible entities, but its subject-matter is not perceptible [Aristotle] |
| 10958 | Perhaps numbers are substances? [Aristotle] |
| 13273 | Pluralities divide into discontinous countables; magnitudes divide into continuous things [Aristotle] |
| 12488 | The idea of 'one' is the simplest, most obvious and most widespread idea [Locke] |
| 12074 | The one in number just is the particular [Aristotle] |
| 17859 | Units came about when the unequals were equalised [Aristotle] |
| 17844 | The unit is stipulated to be indivisible [Aristotle] |
| 17845 | If only rectilinear figures existed, then unity would be the triangle [Aristotle] |
| 17861 | Two men do not make one thing, as well as themselves [Aristotle] |
| 646 | When we count, are we adding, or naming numbers? [Aristotle] |
| 12489 | If there were real infinities, you could add two together, which is ridiculous [Locke] |
| 17850 | Each many is just ones, and is measured by the one [Aristotle] |
| 17851 | Number is plurality measured by unity [Aristotle] |
| 17843 | The idea of 'one' is the foundation of number [Aristotle] |
| 9793 | Mathematics studies abstracted relations, commensurability and proportion [Aristotle] |
| 13738 | It is a simple truth that the objects of mathematics have being, of some sort [Aristotle] |
| 12339 | Aristotle removes ontology from mathematics, and replaces the true with the beautiful [Aristotle, by Badiou] |
| 12556 | Mathematics is just about ideas, so whether circles exist is irrelevant [Locke] |
| 7782 | Every simple idea we ever have brings the idea of unity along with it [Locke] |
| 568 | Some things exist as substances, others as properties of substances [Aristotle] |
| 12348 | There are four kinds of being: incidental, per se, potential and actual, and being as truth [Aristotle, by Wedin] |
| 11194 | Being is either what falls in the categories, or what makes propositions true [Aristotle, by Aquinas] |
| 15776 | There is only being in a certain way, and without that way there is no being [Aristotle] |
| 611 | Being, taken simply as being, is the domain of philosophy [Aristotle] |
| 12270 | Being is one [Melissus, by Aristotle] |
| 11288 | Things are predicated of the basic thing, which isn't predicated of anything else [Aristotle] |
| 11232 | Primary being ('proté ousia') exists in virtue of itself, not in relation to other things [Aristotle, by Politis] |
| 11234 | The three main candidates for primary being are particular, universal and essence; essence is the answer [Aristotle, by Politis] |
| 11279 | Primary being is either universals, or the basis of predication, or essence [Aristotle, by Politis] |
| 11293 | Non-primary beings lack essence, or only have a derived essence [Aristotle, by Politis] |
| 11297 | Primary being is both the essence, and the subject of predication [Aristotle, by Politis] |
| 566 | If nothing exists except individuals, how can there be a science of infinity? [Aristotle] |
| 16090 | Being must be understood with reference to one primary sense - the being of substance [Aristotle, by Gill,ML] |
| 570 | Nothing is added to a man's existence by saying he is 'one', or that 'he exists' [Aristotle] |
| 12061 | The primary subject seems to be substance, to the fullest extent [Aristotle] |
| 10946 | Existence requires thisness, as quantity or quality [Aristotle] |
| 16152 | Other types of being all depend on the being of substance [Aristotle] |
| 11295 | There is no being unless it is determinate and well-defined [Aristotle, by Politis] |
| 13735 | Aristotle discusses fundamental units of being, rather than existence questions [Aristotle, by Schaffer,J] |
| 8910 | General and universal are not real entities, but useful inventions of the mind, concerning words or ideas [Locke] |
| 12554 | Existences can only be known by experience [Locke] |
| 16118 | Nature is an active principle of change, like potentiality, but it is intrinsic to things [Aristotle] |
| 15768 | An actuality is usually thought to be a process [Aristotle] |
| 11154 | Prior things can exist without posterior things, but not vice versa [Aristotle] |
| 12502 | Comparisons boil down to simple elements of sensation or reflection [Locke] |
| 12568 | God assures me of the existence of external things [Locke] |
| 12095 | Knowledge of potential is universal and indefinite; of the actual it is definite and of individuals [Aristotle] |
| 11256 | Materialists cannot explain change [Aristotle, by Politis] |
| 12516 | Obscure simple ideas result from poor senses, brief impressions, or poor memory [Locke] |
| 12517 | Ideas are uncertain when they are unnamed, because too close to other ideas [Locke] |
| 13435 | We can't categorise things by their real essences, because these are unknown [Locke] |
| 12535 | If we discovered real essences, we would still categorise things by the external appearance [Locke] |
| 12347 | The immediate divisions of that which is are genera, each with its science [Aristotle] |
| 13436 | There are no gaps in the continuum of nature, and everything has something closely resembling it [Locke] |
| 7935 | There cannot be uninstantiated properties [Aristotle, by Macdonald,C] |
| 16161 | Properties are just the ways in which forms are realised at various times [Aristotle, by Frede,M] |
| 15109 | The 'propriae' or 'necessary accidents' of a thing are separate, and derived from the essence [Aristotle, by Koslicki] |
| 17849 | For two things to differ in some respect, they must both possess that respect [Aristotle] |
| 7686 | For Aristotle, there are only as many properties as actually exist [Aristotle, by Jacquette] |
| 10947 | Whiteness can be explained without man, but femaleness cannot be explained without animal [Aristotle] |
| 10956 | If we only saw bronze circles, would bronze be part of the concept of a circle? [Aristotle] |
| 16113 | Potentiality is a principle of change, in another thing, or as another thing [Aristotle] |
| 12490 | Power is active or passive, and has a relation to actions [Locke] |
| 16114 | Active 'dunamis' is best translated as 'power' or 'ability' (rather than 'potentiality') [Aristotle, by Gill,ML] |
| 12477 | We get the idea of power from our own actions, and the interaction of external bodies [Locke] |
| 12521 | We can only know a thing's powers when we have combined it with many things [Locke] |
| 15773 | Actualities are arranged by priority, going back to what initiates process [Aristotle] |
| 11387 | The main characteristic of the source of change is activity [energeia] [Aristotle, by Politis] |
| 15974 | The essence of whiteness in a man is nothing but the power to produce the idea of whiteness [Locke] |
| 16753 | Giving the function of a house defines its actuality [Aristotle] |
| 15976 | What is the texture - the real essence - which makes substances behave in distinct ways? [Locke] |
| 15780 | Potentiality in geometry is metaphorical [Aristotle] |
| 11938 | The Megarans say something is only capable of something when it is actually doing it [Aristotle] |
| 15766 | Megaran actualism is just scepticism about the qualities of things [Aristotle] |
| 15767 | Megaran actualists prevent anything from happening, by denying a capacity for it to happen! [Aristotle] |
| 15983 | Locke explains powers, but effectively eliminates them with his talk of internal structure [Locke, by Alexander,P] |
| 11379 | Substance is not a universal, as the former is particular but a universal is shared [Aristotle] |
| 12096 | Universals are indeterminate and only known in potential, because they are general [Aristotle, by Witt] |
| 6487 | Locke, Berkeley and Hume did no serious thinking about universals [Robinson,H on Locke] |
| 649 | The acquisition of scientific knowledge is impossible without universals [Aristotle] |
| 12094 | No universals exist separately from particulars [Aristotle] |
| 10948 | Forms are said to be substances to which nothing is prior [Aristotle] |
| 647 | There is a confusion because Forms are said to be universal, but also some Forms are separable and particular [Aristotle] |
| 16110 | If partaking explains unity, what causes participating, and what is participating? [Aristotle] |
| 633 | If you accept Forms, you must accept the more powerful principle of 'participating' in them [Aristotle] |
| 643 | How can the Forms both be the substance of things and exist separately from them? [Aristotle] |
| 9483 | Forms have to be their own paradigms, which seems to fuse the paradigm and the copy [Aristotle] |
| 16108 | If men exist by participating in two forms (Animal and Biped), they are plural, not unities [Aristotle] |
| 605 | The Forms have to be potentialities, not actual knowledge or movement [Aristotle] |
| 618 | There is no point at all in the theory of Forms unless it contains a principle that produces movement [Aristotle] |
| 640 | All attempts to prove the Forms are either invalid, or prove Forms where there aren't supposed to be any [Aristotle] |
| 641 | Are there forms for everything, or for negations, or for destroyed things? [Aristotle] |
| 4470 | Aristotle is not asserting facts about the location of properties, but about their ontological status [Aristotle, by Moreland] |
| 645 | If two is part of three then numbers aren't Forms, because they would all be intermingled [Aristotle] |
| 642 | What possible contribution can the Forms make to perceptible entities? [Aristotle] |
| 16145 | Predications only pick out kinds of things, not things in themselves [Aristotle] |
| 7717 | All things that exist are particulars [Locke] |
| 7718 | Universals do not exist, but are useful inventions of the mind, involving words or ideas [Locke] |
| 16158 | Form and matter may not make up a concrete particular, because there are also accidents like weight [Aristotle, by Frede,M] |
| 12499 | Bodies distinctively have cohesion of parts, and power to communicate motion [Locke] |
| 16086 | Objects lacking matter are intrinsic unities [Aristotle] |
| 10945 | Some philosophers say that in some qualified way non-existent things 'are' [Aristotle] |
| 11247 | To know a thing is to know its primary cause or explanation [Aristotle] |
| 12062 | Aristotle's form improves on being non-predicable as a way to identify a 'this' [Aristotle, by Wiggins] |
| 1211 | Viewing an object at an instant, we perceive identity when we see it must be that thing and not another [Locke] |
| 12508 | Living things retain identity through change, by a principle of organisation [Locke] |
| 12506 | A thing is individuated just by existing at a time and place [Locke] |
| 12563 | Obviously two bodies cannot be in the same place [Locke] |
| 16160 | For Aristotle, things are not made individual by some essential distinguishing mark [Aristotle, by Frede,M] |
| 12529 | I speak of a 'sortal' name, from the word 'sort' [Locke] |
| 16156 | Individuals within a species differ in their matter, form and motivating cause [Aristotle] |
| 16163 | Aristotle says that the form is what makes an entity what it is [Aristotle, by Frede,M] |
| 590 | Things are one numerically in matter, formally in their account, generically in predicates, and by analogy in relations [Aristotle] |
| 10949 | Primary things just are what-it-is-to-be-that-thing [Aristotle] |
| 603 | How is man a unity of animal and biped, especially if the Forms of animal and of biped exist? [Aristotle] |
| 17838 | Things may be naturally unified because they involve an indivisible process [Aristotle] |
| 17841 | The formal cause may be what unifies a substance [Aristotle] |
| 17840 | A unity may just be a particular, a numerically indivisible thing [Aristotle] |
| 13272 | Things are one to the extent that they are indivisible [Aristotle] |
| 17842 | Indivisibility is the cause of unity, either in movement, or in the account or thought [Aristotle] |
| 17860 | Things are unified by contact, mixture and position [Aristotle] |
| 17839 | Some things are unified by their account, which rests on a unified thought about the thing [Aristotle] |
| 615 | The Pre-Socratics were studying the principles, elements and causes of substance [Aristotle] |
| 11231 | 'Ousia' is 'primary being' not 'primary substance' [Aristotle, by Politis] |
| 12076 | Substance is prior in being separate, in definition, and in knowledge [Aristotle, by Witt] |
| 11284 | It is wrong to translate 'ousia' as 'substance' [Aristotle, by Politis] |
| 569 | If substance is the basis of reality, then philosophy aims to understand substance [Aristotle] |
| 592 | The baffling question of what exists is asking about the nature of substance [Aristotle] |
| 8546 | Powers are part of our idea of substances [Locke] |
| 599 | We may have to postulate unobservable and unknowable substances [Aristotle] |
| 600 | Elements and physical objects are substances, but ideas and mathematics are not so clear [Aristotle] |
| 16778 | Mature Aristotle sees organisms as the paradigm substances [Aristotle, by Pasnau] |
| 16084 | Is a primary substance a foundation of existence, or the last stage of understanding? [Aristotle, by Gill,ML] |
| 1196 | We can conceive of three sorts of substance: God, finite intelligence, and bodies [Locke] |
| 12536 | We sort and name substances by nominal and not by real essence [Locke] |
| 11299 | Substance [ousia] is the subject of predication and cause [aitia?] of something's existence [Aristotle] |
| 12060 | Essence (fixed by definition) is also 'ousia', so 'ousia' is both ultimate subject, and a this-thing [Aristotle] |
| 10941 | A substance is what-it-is-to-be, or the universal, or the genus, or the subject of saying [Aristotle] |
| 595 | It is matter that turns out to be substance [ousia] [Aristotle] |
| 11290 | Matter is not substance, because substance needs separability and thisness [Aristotle] |
| 10959 | The substance is the form dwelling in the object [Aristotle] |
| 12093 | Substance is unified and universals are diverse, so universals are not substance [Aristotle, by Witt] |
| 12362 | A thing's substance is its primary cause of being [Aristotle] |
| 11233 | In Aristotle, 'proté ousia' is 'primary being', and 'to hupokeimenon' is 'that which lies under' (or 'substance') [Aristotle, by Politis] |
| 12079 | Substance is distinct being because of its unity [Aristotle, by Witt] |
| 7945 | We think of substance as experienced qualities plus a presumed substratum of support [Locke] |
| 607 | None of the universals can be a substance [Aristotle] |
| 12485 | We don't know what substance is, and only vaguely know what it does [Locke] |
| 10951 | The statue is not called 'stone' but 'stoney' [Aristotle] |
| 16096 | Statues depend on their bronze, but bronze doesn't depend on statues [Aristotle, by Gill,ML] |
| 16085 | Primary matter and form make a unity, one in potentiality, the other in actuality [Aristotle] |
| 16796 | Locke may accept coinciding material substances, such as body, man and person [Locke, by Pasnau] |
| 16164 | Forms of sensible substances include unrealised possibilities, so are not fully actual [Aristotle, by Frede,M] |
| 11285 | The form of a thing is its essence and its primary being [Aristotle] |
| 12345 | In 'Metaphysics' Z substantial primacy (as form) is explanatory rather than ontological [Aristotle, by Wedin] |
| 16147 | In 'Metaphysics' substantial forms take over from objects as primary [Aristotle, by Frede,M] |
| 12071 | Essences are not properties (since those can't cause individual substances) [Aristotle, by Witt] |
| 11251 | Plato says changing things have no essence; Aristotle disagrees [Aristotle, by Politis] |
| 12084 | Essential form is neither accidental nor necessary to matter, so it appears not to be a property [Aristotle, by Witt] |
| 16119 | Aristotle's cosmos is ordered by form, and disordered by matter [Aristotle, by Gill,ML] |
| 16148 | Aristotle moved from realism to nominalism about substances [Aristotle, by Frede,M] |
| 16112 | A substance is a proper subject because the matter is a property of the form, not vice versa [Aristotle, by Gill,ML] |
| 12002 | Aristotle doesn't think essential properties are those which must belong to a thing [Aristotle, by Kung] |
| 16095 | Some forms, such as the Prime Mover, are held by Aristotle to exist without matter [Aristotle, by Gill,ML] |
| 15853 | A true substance is constituted by some nature, which is a principle [Aristotle] |
| 16109 | Things are a unity because there is no clash between potential matter and actual shape/form [Aristotle] |
| 16088 | Aristotle's solution to the problem of unity is that form is an active cause or potentiality or nature [Aristotle, by Gill,ML] |
| 12301 | Every distinct thing has matter, as long as it isn't an essence or a Form [Aristotle] |
| 16092 | In Aristotle, bronze only becomes 'matter' when it is potentially a statue [Aristotle, by Gill,ML] |
| 12300 | Aristotle's conception of matter applies to non-physical objects as well as physical objects [Aristotle, by Fine,K] |
| 12077 | Aristotle's matter is something that could be the inner origin of a natural being's behaviour [Aristotle, by Witt] |
| 12103 | Matter is secondary, because it is potential, determined by the actuality of form [Aristotle, by Witt] |
| 597 | Is there a house over and above its bricks? [Aristotle] |
| 12507 | A mass consists of its atoms, so the addition or removal of one changes its identity [Locke] |
| 16575 | Something must pre-exist any new production [Aristotle] |
| 10962 | It is unclear whether Aristotle believes in a propertyless subject, his 'ultimate matter' [Aristotle, by Lawson-Tancred] |
| 16142 | A substrate is either a 'this' supporting qualities, or 'matter' supporting actuality [Aristotle] |
| 16103 | A subject can't be nothing, so it must qualify as separate, and as having a distinct identity [Aristotle, by Gill,ML] |
| 12559 | Complex ideas are collections of qualities we attach to an unknown substratum [Locke] |
| 10942 | If you extract all features of the object, what is left over? [Aristotle] |
| 13274 | The contents of an explanatory formula are parts of the whole [Aristotle] |
| 15852 | A 'whole' (rather than a mere 'sum') requires an internal order which distinguishes it [Aristotle] |
| 15840 | If a syllable is more than its elements, is the extra bit also an element? [Aristotle] |
| 16136 | A syllable is something different from its component vowels and consonants [Aristotle] |
| 12878 | Wholes are continuous, rigid, uniform, similar, same kind, similar matter [Aristotle, by Simons] |
| 11199 | Aristotelian essence underlies behaviour, or underlies definition, or is the source of existence [Aristotle, by Aquinas] |
| 12304 | Aristotelian essence is retained with identity through change, and bases our scientific knowledge [Aristotle, by Copi] |
| 11294 | Aristotle says changing, material things (and not just universals) have an essence [Aristotle, by Politis] |
| 11298 | Are essences actually universals? [Aristotle, by Politis] |
| 12498 | Particular substances are coexisting ideas that seem to flow from a hidden essence [Locke] |
| 12520 | The best I can make of real essence is figure, size and connection of solid parts [Locke] |
| 13771 | Real essence is the constitution of the unknown parts of a body which produce its qualities [Locke] |
| 12099 | Aristotelian essences are causal, not classificatory [Aristotle, by Witt] |
| 16038 | Locke may distinguish real essence from internal constitution, claiming the latter is knowable [Locke, by Jones,J-E] |
| 17846 | The essence of a single thing is the essence of a particular [Aristotle] |
| 12311 | Particulars are not definable, because they fluctuate [Aristotle] |
| 12070 | Individual essences are not universals, since those can't be substances, or cause them [Aristotle, by Witt] |
| 12069 | Essence is the cause of individual substance, and creates its unity [Aristotle, by Witt] |
| 12088 | Aristotelian essence is not universal properties, but individual essence [Aristotle, by Witt] |
| 11998 | Aristotle does not accept individual essences; essential properties are always general [Aristotle, by Kung] |
| 12083 | Aristotle's essence explains the existence of an individual substance, not its properties [Aristotle, by Witt] |
| 11382 | Aristotle takes essence and form as a particular, not (as some claim) as a universal, the species [Aristotle, by Politis] |
| 16097 | To be a subject a thing must be specifiable, with some essential properties [Aristotle, by Gill,ML] |
| 12810 | We can conceive an individual without assigning it to a kind [Locke, by Jolley] |
| 16786 | You can't distinguish individuals without the species as a standard [Locke] |
| 15992 | Many individuals grouped under one name vary more than some things that have different names [Locke] |
| 11287 | Essence is what is stated in the definition [Aristotle, by Politis] |
| 12091 | If definition is of universals, many individuals have no definition, and hence no essence [Aristotle, by Witt] |
| 10963 | A thing's essence is what is mentioned in its definition [Aristotle, by Lawson-Tancred] |
| 11292 | Things have an essence if their explanation is a definition [Aristotle] |
| 11188 | The Aristotelian view is that the essential properties are those that sort an object [Aristotle, by Marcus (Barcan)] |
| 12530 | The less rational view of essences is that they are moulds for kinds of natural thing [Locke] |
| 12532 | Even real essence depends on a sort, since it is sorts which have the properties [Locke] |
| 12539 | If every sort has its real essence, one horse, being many sorts, will have many essences [Locke] |
| 11291 | A thing's essence is its intrinsic nature [Aristotle] |
| 12098 | An essence causes both its own unity and its kind [Aristotle] |
| 11155 | Essence is the very being of any thing, whereby it is what it is [Locke] |
| 12510 | Not all identity is unity of substance [Locke] |
| 10964 | Having an essence is the criterion of being a substance [Aristotle, by Lawson-Tancred] |
| 15107 | Aristotle doesn't see essential truths or essential properties as necessary [Aristotle, by Koslicki] |
| 12560 | We can only slightly know necessary co-existence of qualities, if they are primary [Locke] |
| 11244 | Metaphysics is the science of ultimate explanation, or of pure existence, or of primary existence [Aristotle, by Politis] |
| 16787 | Explanatory essence won't do, because it won't distinguish the accidental from the essential [Locke, by Pasnau] |
| 16143 | It is absurd that a this and a substance should be composed of a quality [Aristotle] |
| 16028 | Lockean real essence makes a thing what it is, and produces its observable qualities [Locke, by Jones,J-E] |
| 12305 | Locke's essences determine the other properties, so the two will change together [Locke, by Copi] |
| 15985 | It is impossible for two things with the same real essence to differ in properties [Locke] |
| 12534 | We cannot know what properties are necessary to gold, unless we first know its real essence [Locke] |
| 16106 | Generalities like man and horse are not substances, but universal composites of account and matter [Aristotle] |
| 16144 | Genera are not substances, and do not exist apart from the ingredient species [Aristotle] |
| 12359 | 'Categories' answers 'what?' with species, genus, differerentia; 'Met.' Z.17 seeks causal essence [Aristotle, by Wedin] |
| 12068 | Standardly, Aristotelian essences are taken to be universals of the species [Aristotle, by Witt] |
| 16141 | In 'Met.' he says genera can't be substances or qualities, so aren't in the ontology [Aristotle, by Frede,M] |
| 13434 | In our ideas, the idea of essence is inseparable from the concept of a species [Locke] |
| 16035 | If we based species on real essences, the individuals would be as indistinguishable as two circles [Locke] |
| 16036 | Internal constitution doesn't decide a species; should a watch contain four wheels or five? [Locke] |
| 16508 | Things are more unified if the unity comes from their own nature, not from external force [Aristotle] |
| 16117 | The hallmark of an artefact is that its active source of maintenance is external [Aristotle, by Gill,ML] |
| 12540 | Artificial things like watches and pistols have distinct kinds [Locke] |
| 16031 | Real essence explains observable qualities, but not what kind of thing it is [Locke, by Jones,J-E] |
| 15646 | If essence is 'nominal', artificial gold (with its surface features) would qualify as 'gold' [Locke, by Eagle] |
| 12306 | 'Nominal essence' is everything contained in the idea of a particular sort of thing [Locke, by Copi] |
| 15988 | The observable qualities are never the real essence, since they depend on real essence [Locke] |
| 12537 | To be a nominal essence, a complex idea must exhibit unity [Locke] |
| 15644 | In nominal essence, Locke confuses the set of properties with the abstracted idea of them [Eagle on Locke] |
| 16029 | Locke's real and nominal essence refers back to Aristotle's real and nominal definitions [Locke, by Jones,J-E] |
| 12531 | Nominal Essence is the abstract idea to which a name is attached [Locke] |
| 13433 | Essences relate to sorting words; if you replace those with names, essences vanish [Locke] |
| 12533 | Real essences are unknown, so only the nominal essence connects things to a species [Locke] |
| 12557 | Our ideas of substance are based on mental archetypes, but these come from the world [Locke] |
| 12561 | For 'all gold is malleable' to be necessary, it must be part of gold's nominal essence [Locke] |
| 12092 | Aristotle claims that the individual is epistemologically prior to the universal [Aristotle, by Witt] |
| 12090 | Actual knowledge is of the individual, and potential knowledge of the universal [Aristotle, by Witt] |
| 12525 | The essence of a triangle is simple; presumably substance essences are similar [Locke] |
| 13431 | A space between three lines is both the nominal and real essence of a triangle, the source of its properties [Locke] |
| 13423 | The schools recognised that they don't really know essences, because they couldn't coin names for them [Locke] |
| 12804 | There are no independent natural kinds - or our classifications have to be subjective [Locke, by Jolley] |
| 12547 | We know five properties of gold, but cannot use four of them to predict the fifth one [Locke] |
| 12503 | Identity means that the idea of a thing remains the same over time [Locke] |
| 16159 | For animate things, only the form, not the matter or properties, must persist through change [Aristotle, by Frede,M] |
| 12505 | One thing cannot have two beginnings of existence, nor two things one beginning [Locke] |
| 11378 | How a thing is generated does not explain its essence [Aristotle, by Politis] |
| 12101 | Aristotle wants definition, not identity, so origin is not essential to him [Aristotle, by Witt] |
| 11380 | Two things with the same primary being and essence are one thing [Aristotle] |
| 16795 | Same person, man or substance are different identities, belonging to different ideas [Locke] |
| 17848 | Things such as two different quadrangles are alike but not wholly the same [Aristotle] |
| 16134 | We can't understand self-identity without a prior grasp of the object [Aristotle] |
| 17847 | You are one with yourself in form and matter [Aristotle] |
| 12504 | Two things can't occupy one place and time, which leads us to the idea of self-identity [Locke] |
| 12611 | Necessity makes alternatives impossible [Aristotle] |
| 17852 | A thing has a feature necessarily if its denial brings a contradiction [Aristotle] |
| 15779 | Possibility is when the necessity of the contrary is false [Aristotle] |
| 15769 | Anything which is possible either exists or will come into existence [Aristotle] |
| 15774 | We recognise potentiality from actuality [Aristotle] |
| 14544 | Potentialities are always for action, but are conditional on circumstances [Aristotle] |
| 15777 | A 'potentiality' is a principle of change or process in a thing [Aristotle] |
| 15778 | Things are destroyed not by their powers, but by their lack of them [Aristotle] |
| 12612 | Some things have external causes of their necessity; others (the simple) generate necessities [Aristotle] |
| 15108 | Aristotle's says necessary truths are distinct and derive from essential truths [Aristotle, by Koslicki] |
| 12553 | Some of our ideas contain relations which we cannot conceive to be absent [Locke] |
| 547 | The ability to teach is a mark of true knowledge [Aristotle] |
| 12544 | Our knowledge falls short of the extent of our own ideas [Locke] |
| 12574 | When two ideas agree in my mind, I cannot refuse to see and know it [Locke] |
| 544 | Experience knows particulars, but only skill knows universals [Aristotle] |
| 10950 | Things are produced from skill if the form of them is in the mind [Aristotle] |
| 546 | It takes skill to know causes, not experience [Aristotle] |
| 15995 | The greatest certainty is knowing our own ideas, and that two ideas are different [Locke] |
| 12562 | General certainty is only found in ideas [Locke] |
| 12569 | Knowledge by senses is less certain than that by intuition or reason, but it is still knowledge [Locke] |
| 12564 | I am as certain of the thing doubting, as I am of the doubt [Locke] |
| 7570 | Innate ideas are trivial (if they are just potentials) or absurd (if they claim infants know a lot) [Locke, by Jolley] |
| 12472 | If the only test of innateness is knowing, then all of our knowledge is innate [Locke] |
| 7709 | A proposition can't be in the mind if we aren't conscious of it [Locke] |
| 4018 | Innate ideas were followed up with innate doctrines, which stopped reasoning and made social control possible [Locke] |
| 7723 | The senses first let in particular ideas, which furnish the empty cabinet [Locke] |
| 7507 | The mind is white paper, with no writing, or ideas [Locke] |
| 12474 | The mind is a blank page, on which only experience can write [Locke] |
| 12518 | The mind cannot produce simple ideas [Locke] |
| 12478 | A 'quality' is a power to produce an idea in our minds [Locke] |
| 15989 | Colours, smells and tastes are ideas; the secondary qualities have no colour, smell or taste [Locke, by Alexander,P] |
| 15971 | Secondary qualities are powers of complex primary qualities to produce sensations in us [Locke] |
| 12481 | Hands can report conflicting temperatures, but not conflicting shapes [Locke] |
| 12546 | We can't know how primary and secondary qualities connect together [Locke] |
| 6725 | Locke believes matter is an inert, senseless substance, with extension, figure and motion [Locke, by Berkeley] |
| 15982 | Qualities are named as primary if they are needed for scientific explanation [Locke, by Alexander,P] |
| 12479 | Primary qualities produce simple ideas, such as solidity, extension, motion and number [Locke] |
| 12480 | Ideas of primary qualities resemble their objects, but those of secondary qualities don't [Locke] |
| 7049 | In Locke, the primary qualities are also powers [Locke, by Heil] |
| 15973 | In my view Locke's 'textures' are groups of corpuscles which are powers (rather than 'having' powers) [Locke, by Alexander,P] |
| 7050 | I suspect that Locke did not actually believe colours are 'in the mind' [Locke, by Heil] |
| 15979 | Secondary qualities are simply the bare powers of an object [Locke] |
| 12482 | Molyneux's Question: could a blind man distinguish cube from sphere, if he regained his sight? [Locke] |
| 7724 | All the ideas written on the white paper of the mind can only come from one place - experience [Locke] |
| 12527 | Some ideas connect together naturally, while others connect by chance or custom [Locke] |
| 12555 | The constant link between whiteness and things that produce it is the basis of our knowledge [Locke] |
| 12542 | Knowledge is just the connection or disagreement of our ideas [Locke] |
| 16637 | The absolute boundaries of our thought are the ideas we get from senses and the mind [Locke] |
| 543 | All men long to understand, as shown by their delight in the senses [Aristotle] |
| 2793 | It is unclear how identity, equality, perfection, God, power and cause derive from experience [Locke, by Dancy,J] |
| 12543 | Intuition gives us direct and certain knowledge of what is obvious [Locke] |
| 19517 | Believing without a reason may just be love of your own fantasies [Locke] |
| 583 | The starting point of a proof is not a proof [Aristotle] |
| 15977 | Facts beyond immediate experience are assessed by agreement with known truths and observations [Locke] |
| 2555 | For Locke knowledge relates to objects, not to propositions [Locke, by Rorty] |
| 10326 | Other men's opinions don't add to our knowledge - even when they are true [Locke] |
| 581 | Dreams aren't a serious problem. No one starts walking round Athens next morning, having dreamt that they were there! [Aristotle] |
| 6488 | Locke has no patience with scepticism [Locke, by Robinson,H] |
| 584 | If truth is relative it is relational, and concerns appearances relative to a situation [Aristotle] |
| 585 | If relativism is individual, how can something look sweet and not taste it, or look different to our two eyes? [Aristotle] |
| 576 | If the majority had diseased taste, and only a few were healthy, relativists would have to prefer the former [Aristotle] |
| 12309 | There cannot be a science of accidentals, but only of general truths [Aristotle] |
| 11386 | Demonstrations about particulars must be about everything of that type [Aristotle] |
| 11385 | Universal principles are not primary beings, but particular principles are not universally knowable [Aristotle] |
| 11289 | Understanding moves from the less to the more intelligible [Aristotle] |
| 11246 | Aristotelian explanations mainly divide things into natural kinds [Aristotle, by Politis] |
| 16135 | Real enquiries seek causes, and causes are essences [Aristotle] |
| 11384 | We know something when we fully know what it is, not just its quality, quantity or location [Aristotle] |
| 16105 | We know a thing when we grasp its essence [Aristotle] |
| 11296 | The explanation is what gives matter its state, which is the form, which is the substance [Aristotle] |
| 11999 | Essential properties explain in conjunction with properties shared by the same kind [Aristotle, by Kung] |
| 16037 | Locke seems to use real essence for scientific explanation, and substratum for the being of a thing [Locke, by Jones,J-E] |
| 16032 | To explain qualities, Locke invokes primary and secondary qualities, not real essences [Locke, by Jones,J-E] |
| 12519 | Gold is supposed to have a real essence, from whence its detectable properties flow [Locke] |
| 12551 | We are satisfied that other men have minds, from their words and actions [Locke] |
| 12483 | Unlike humans, animals cannot entertain general ideas [Locke] |
| 5002 | Consciousness is the perception of what passes in a man's own mind [Locke] |
| 2603 | If we aren't aware that an idea is innate, the concept of innate is meaningless; if we do, all ideas seem innate [Locke] |
| 2421 | There is nothing illogical about inverted qualia [Locke] |
| 3522 | The same object might produce violet in one mind and marigold in another [Locke] |
| 7721 | Locke's view that thoughts are made of ideas asserts the crucial role of imagination [Locke] |
| 12476 | Every external object or internal idea suggests to us the idea of unity [Locke] |
| 12501 | The mind can make a unity out of anything, no matter how diverse [Locke] |
| 9088 | Skill comes from a general assumption obtained from thinking about similar things [Aristotle] |
| 16153 | Aristotle distinguishes two different sorts of generality - kinds, and properties [Aristotle, by Frede,M] |
| 9083 | The mind creates abstractions by generalising about appearances of objects, ignoring time or place [Locke] |
| 7040 | General words represent general ideas, which are abstractions from immediate circumstances [Locke] |
| 9791 | Science is more accurate when it is prior and simpler, especially without magnitude or movement [Aristotle] |
| 12528 | If a man sees a friend die in a room, he associates the pain with the room [Locke] |
| 5512 | Locke uses 'self' for a momentary entity, and 'person' for an extended one [Locke, by Martin/Barresi] |
| 1202 | A person is intelligent, rational, self-aware, continuous, conscious [Locke] |
| 1381 | Someone mad then sane is two persons, judging by our laws and punishments [Locke] |
| 1385 | 'Person' is a term used about responsibility, involving law, and happiness and misery [Locke] |
| 1372 | Our personal identity must depend on something we are aware of, namely consciousness [Locke] |
| 1378 | My little finger is part of me if I am conscious of it [Locke] |
| 571 | Is Socrates the same person when standing and when seated? [Aristotle] |
| 5175 | Personal identity is my perceptions, but not my memory, as I forget too much [Ayer on Locke] |
| 1363 | Locke's theory confusingly tries to unite consciousness and memory [Reid on Locke] |
| 1368 | Locke mistakes similarity of a memory to its original event for identity [Reid on Locke] |
| 1373 | Identity over time involves remembering actions just as they happened [Locke] |
| 1380 | Should we punish people who commit crimes in their sleep? [Locke] |
| 5511 | For Locke, conscious awareness unifies a person at an instant and over time [Locke, by Martin/Barresi] |
| 12509 | If the soul individuates a man, and souls are transferable, then a hog could be a man [Locke] |
| 1376 | Identity must be in consciousness not substance, because it seems transferable [Locke] |
| 12512 | If someone becomes conscious of Nestor's actions, then he is Nestor [Locke] |
| 12513 | If a prince's soul entered a cobbler's body, the person would be the prince (and the man the cobbler) [Locke] |
| 12514 | On Judgement Day, no one will be punished for actions they cannot remember [Locke] |
| 1397 | Locke sees underlying substance as irrelevant to personal identity [Locke, by Noonan] |
| 6139 | Locke implies that each thought has two thinkers - me, and 'my' substance [Merricks on Locke] |
| 5513 | Two persons might have qualitatively identical consciousnesses, so that isn't enough [Kant on Locke] |
| 1345 | Locke's move from substance to consciousness is a slippery slope [Butler on Locke] |
| 1197 | No two thoughts at different times can be the same, as they have different beginnings [Locke] |
| 1364 | Locke confuses the test for personal identity with the thing itself [Reid on Locke] |
| 12511 | If consciousness is interrupted, and we forget our past selves, are we still the same thinking thing? [Locke] |
| 1361 | If identity is consciousness, could a person move between bodies or fragment into parts? [Reid on Locke] |
| 21326 | Locke's memory theory of identity confuses personal identity with the test for it [Reid on Locke] |
| 1387 | Butler thought Locke's theory was doomed once he rejected mental substance [Perry on Locke] |
| 12809 | Nothing about me is essential [Locke] |
| 3792 | We are free to decide not to follow our desires [Locke] |
| 12494 | Men are not free to will, because they cannot help willing [Locke] |
| 12492 | Liberty is a power of agents, so can't be an attribute of wills [Locke] |
| 12493 | A man is free insofar as he can act according to his own preferences [Locke] |
| 7840 | For all we know, an omnipotent being might have enabled material beings to think [Locke] |
| 12500 | Thinking without matter and matter that thinks are equally baffling [Locke] |
| 15996 | We can't begin to conceive what would produce some particular experience within our minds [Locke] |
| 12552 | Thoughts moving bodies, and bodies producing thoughts, are equally unknowable [Locke] |
| 23311 | Aristotle sees reason as much more specific than our more everyday concept of it [Aristotle, by Frede,M] |
| 23310 | Animals live by sensations, and some have good memories, but they don't connect experiences [Aristotle] |
| 6712 | For Locke, abstract ideas are our main superiority of understanding over animals [Locke, by Berkeley] |
| 11245 | Many memories make up a single experience [Aristotle] |
| 6486 | Ideas are the objects of understanding when we think [Locke] |
| 12496 | Complex ideas are all resolvable into simple ideas [Locke] |
| 15967 | The word 'idea' covers thinking best, for imaginings, concepts, and basic experiences [Locke] |
| 12475 | All our ideas derive either from sensation, or from inner reflection [Locke] |
| 17735 | Simple ideas are produced in us by external things, and they match their appearances [Locke] |
| 12471 | Innate ideas are nothing, if they are in the mind but we are unaware of them [Locke] |
| 10954 | It is unclear whether acute angles are prior to right angles, or fingers to men [Aristotle] |
| 5827 | A species of thing is an abstract idea, and a word is a sign that refers to the idea [Locke] |
| 9792 | Mathematicians study quantity and continuity, and remove the perceptible features of things [Aristotle] |
| 9077 | Mathematicians suppose inseparable aspects to be separable, and study them in isolation [Aristotle] |
| 9075 | If health happened to be white, the science of health would not study whiteness [Aristotle] |
| 7716 | Words were devised as signs for inner ideas, and their basic meaning is those ideas [Locke] |
| 7308 | Words stand for the ideas in the mind of him that uses them [Locke] |
| 12524 | For the correct reference of complex ideas, we can only refer to experts [Locke] |
| 15991 | Since words are just conventional, we can represent our own ideas with any words we please [Locke] |
| 636 | Beauty involves the Forms of order, symmetry and limit, which can be handled mathematically [Aristotle] |
| 635 | The good is found in actions, but beauty can exist without movement [Aristotle] |
| 4130 | There couldn't be a moral rule of which a man could not justly demand a reason [Locke] |
| 12495 | Pursuit of happiness is the highest perfection of intellectual nature [Locke] |
| 12541 | Morality can be demonstrated, because we know the real essences behind moral words [Locke] |
| 12473 | We can demand a reason for any moral rule [Locke] |
| 15772 | A thing's active function is its end [Aristotle] |
| 629 | Is the good a purpose, a source of movement, or a pure form? [Aristotle] |
| 1386 | A concern for happiness is the inevitable result of consciousness [Locke] |
| 4019 | Things are good and evil only in reference to pleasure and pain [Locke] |
| 591 | Excellence is a sort of completion [Aristotle] |
| 625 | Is excellence separate from things, or part of them, or both? [Aristotle] |
| 12515 | Actions are virtuous if they are judged praiseworthy [Locke] |
| 621 | Contemplation is a supreme pleasure and excellence [Aristotle] |
| 12548 | It is certain that injustice requires property, since it is a violation of the right to property [Locke] |
| 11241 | Wise men aren't instructed; they instruct [Aristotle] |
| 15997 | We are so far from understanding the workings of natural bodies that it is pointless to even try [Locke] |
| 632 | Why are some things destructible and others not? [Aristotle] |
| 626 | Everything is arranged around a single purpose [Aristotle] |
| 17858 | Pythagoreans say the whole universe is made of numbers [Aristotle] |
| 601 | Substance must exist, because something must endure during change between opposites [Aristotle] |
| 10955 | Matter is perceptible (like bronze) or intelligible (like mathematical objects) [Aristotle] |
| 16590 | Matter is neither a particular thing nor a member of a determinate category [Aristotle] |
| 12001 | Aristotle says matter is a lesser substance, rather than wholly denying that it is a substance [Aristotle, by Kung] |
| 12299 | Aristotle had a hierarchical conception of matter [Aristotle, by Fine,K] |
| 15771 | Primary matter is what characterises other stuffs, and it has no distinct identity [Aristotle] |
| 12868 | Ultimate matter is discredited, as Aristotle merged substratum of change with bearer of properties [Simons on Aristotle] |
| 15954 | Aristotle may only have believed in prime matter because his elements were immutable [Aristotle, by Alexander,P] |
| 16099 | The traditional view of Aristotle is God (actual form) at top and prime matter (potential matter) at bottom [Aristotle, by Gill,ML] |
| 616 | It doesn't explain the world to say it was originally all one. How did it acquire diversity? [Aristotle] |
| 16098 | I claim that Aristotle's foundation is the four elements, and not wholly potential prime matter [Aristotle, by Gill,ML] |
| 15978 | I take 'matter' to be a body, excluding its extension in space and its shape [Locke] |
| 10952 | Unusual kinds like mule are just a combination of two kinds [Aristotle] |
| 15170 | We distinguish species by their nominal essence, not by their real essence [Locke] |
| 15993 | If we observe total regularity, there must be some unknown law and relationships controlling it [Locke] |
| 561 | Is there cause outside matter, and can it be separated, and is it one or many? [Aristotle] |
| 12497 | Causes are the substances which have the powers to produce action [Locke] |
| 588 | We exercise to be fit, but need fitness to exercise [Aristotle] |
| 634 | Pure Forms and numbers can't cause anything, and especially not movement [Aristotle] |
| 14543 | When a power and its object meet in the right conditions, an action necessarily follows [Aristotle] |
| 12550 | If we knew the minute mechanics of hemlock, we could predict that it kills men [Locke] |
| 15966 | Boyle and Locke believed corpuscular structures necessitate their powers of interaction [Locke, by Alexander,P] |
| 15984 | The corpuscular hypothesis is the best explanation of the necessary connection and co-existence of powers [Locke] |
| 15950 | We will only understand substance when we know the necessary connections between powers and qualities [Locke] |
| 7713 | We identify substances by supposing that groups of sensations arise from an essence [Locke] |
| 12545 | Other spirits may exceed us in knowledge, by knowing the inward constitution of things [Locke] |
| 12484 | Motion is just change of distance between two things [Locke] |
| 3059 | There is no real motion, only the appearance of it [Melissus, by Diog. Laertius] |
| 15986 | Boyle and Locke suspect forces of being occult [Locke, by Alexander,P] |
| 16685 | An insurmountable force in a body keeps our hands apart when we handle it [Locke] |
| 5100 | The void is not required for change, because a plenum can alter in quality [Aristotle on Melissus] |
| 15980 | We can locate the parts of the universe, but not the whole thing [Locke] |
| 617 | It is hard to see how either time or movement could come into existence or be destroyed [Aristotle] |
| 12486 | An 'instant' is where we perceive no succession, and is the time of a single idea [Locke] |
| 12487 | We can never show that two successive periods of time were equal [Locke] |
| 456 | Nothing could come out of nothing [Melissus] |
| 613 | Even if the world is caused by fate, mind and nature are still prior causes [Aristotle] |
| 619 | Something which both moves and is moved is intermediate, so it follows that there must be an unmoved mover [Aristotle] |
| 620 | The first mover is necessary, and because it is necessary it is good [Aristotle] |
| 12567 | It is inconceivable that unthinking matter could produce intelligence [Locke] |
| 622 | There must a source of movement which is eternal, indivisible and without magnitude [Aristotle] |
| 7603 | God is not a creator (involving time and change) and is not concerned with the inferior universe [Aristotle, by Armstrong,K] |
| 12570 | The finite and dependent should obey the supreme and infinite [Locke] |
| 16165 | For Aristotle God is defined in an axiom, for which there is no proof [Aristotle, by Frede,M] |
| 12565 | God has given us no innate idea of himself [Locke] |
| 12566 | We exist, so there is Being, which requires eternal being [Locke] |
| 610 | The world can't be arranged at all if there is nothing eternal and separate [Aristotle] |
| 12571 | If miracles aim at producing belief, it is plausible that their events are very unusual [Locke] |
| 12097 | There are as many eternal unmovable substances as there are movements of the stars [Aristotle] |